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GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS:
A COST/ BENEFIT ANALYSIS
b}
Morcos 1-·. Massoud
ABSTRACT

Increasingly, there is a public awareness that government regulation is
a decidely mixed blessing. While performing some functions that are
desirable and necessary, it also unnecessarily costs jobs, raises prices,
and in various other ways damage\ the economy. A major aim of a
regulatory reform is simply to make sure that the benefits produced by
regulation are worth the costs. It is obvious that over regulation is
costing nations in absolute dollars, employment, and productivity. What
is required in regulatory efforts is a balancing of what economists call
managerial benefits and managerial costs.
INTRODUCTION

One of the fundamental concepts of The American economic syMem
- and a major reason for its success - has been the clarity of purpose of
our private and public sectors. The purpose of the private sector is to be
productive, and thus provide avenues of expression and development for
individual ingenuity, invention, and innovation. The purpose of government's involvement in the economy has equal historic delineation. Laws
and regulations were always meant to exactly (and only) satisfy public
needs that would otherwise remain unmet or to cure public ilb when no
private remedy would suffice. The government was designed as a centralized body functioning to protect the sanctity of the system. fuel the
productivity of business, and preserve the public welfare.
Today, however. due to an unparalleled expansion of government and
its controls, the vital distinction between public and private sector objectives has blurred. As a result, our economic \ystem isn't ~orking as well
as it should. Government has become a seemingly unlimited, selfperpetuating business - the nation's largest employer, consumer. and
spender. In 1976, it accounted for one-third of the Gross National Product with expenditures in excess of $360 billion.
The growth of government and government controls, combined ~ith
the escalating costs of compliance, have had a cumulatively negative effect upon our growth and productivity - the very opposite of what
government is intended to provide.
From 1974 to I 978, federal expenditures (for com um er safety and
health; job safety and other working conditions; energy; financial reporting and other financial controls; and industry-specific regulations)
increased 85 percent, from $2.030 billion to 3.764 billion (7).
Regulation at the federal level splits into two broad categories:
. - Economic Regulation. This deals with competitive performance of
industries such as a irlines, banks, railroads, and so on. The idea is to
regulate the rates charged in instances in which market forces, if left to
themselves, would produce or might produce unsatisfactory results
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judged by "competitive norms"; to control the right to serve specif'
markets; and generally to monitor competitive practices.
ic
- Social Regulation. It is the most volatile and potentially explosive
area o~ regulation. !t centers on areas such as job safety, equal job opportu~1ty, an~ env1ronn:iental concerns such as air, water and noise
pollut10n. Social regulation resulted from the growing belief in the attainment of certain social goals and the increased society's demand for
public goods such as environmental quality.
BENEFITS ANI> CO~TS
Behind every public decision or regulatory program there is some objective or goal that the decision or the program to be cho~en is supposed
to accomplish. Unfortunately, such goals or objectives may not be clearly stated or even fully perceived by the decision maker. Public policy objectives arc usually the product of a political process, not of an individual
decision. They line up partisan interests, distribute desirable and
undesirable effect~. and cau,e reallocation of ;carce re,ources from one
use to another. The decision or the program muse he politically feasible,
socially acceptable. and economically efficient. In trying to measure the
benefits of such decisions or programs, it is important to determine first
what \l.e should \I. ant to measure without being restricted by our beliefs
regarding our current ability to mca,ure things. We should avoid prejudging based on what we may think to be current practice as to what
may be measurable and what may not be.
THE COST-BE'-EFIT APPROACH
The cost-benefit approach focuses on the social welfare effects of the
alternatives under consideration. Its central concern is allocative efficien·
cy: will the reallocation of scarce resources expected from a proposal be
an improvement (in the welfare sense) over their existing use? Will che
social benefits due to the expected rearrangement exceed the social costs?
Here. "benefit" refers to increase in individual welfare. "Cost" is simp·
ly the opposite of benefit; it refers to decrease in welfare, which is the
same as sacrifice of benefits. However, for our analysis, social benefit
(co~t) is defined a, the aggregate benefits (<.:ost5) of all individuals. An at·
tempt also should be made to consider the indirect consequences
re~ulting from the decision - the so-called externalities, side effects, and
,pillovers.
COSTS OF REGULAT IOI\
The growth of federal regulatory activitie, is just plain staggering.
There is no universally accepted way to quantify thi~ spread, but a few
figures illustrate its momentum and meaning. As late as the middle
I 950's, the Federal Government had only four areas of major regulatory
responsibility: antitrust, financial institutions, transportation, and com·
munications. In I 977, according to an exposure draft on "Federal
Regulation: Roads to Reform" released in August 1978 by The
American Bar Association's Commi~sion on Law and Economy, there
were 85 federal agencies regulating some aspect of private activity. Of
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these, over one-fourth were created in the 1969-1975 period.
Another study released in April 1978 by The Joint Economic Committee of Congress concluded that the increase in annual direct federal expenditures for regulatory activity from fiscal 1974 to fiscal 1979 was
I 1511fo - or about $4.8 billion from $2.2 billion over the five year period.
Perhaps even more significant than the sheer magnitude of regulatory
activity is its changing nature. The rising tide of regulation primarily
reflects a growth in "social" regulation rather than the old-style
"economic" regulation.
The period between 1970 and 1975 saw the creation of a number of
major federal regulatory agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency, The Consumer Product Safety Commission, The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and The Department of
Energy. In the same period some 30 major laws were enacted making
substantial changes in the regulatory framework.
The bulk of the overall regulatory budget is now earmarked for these
areas of social regulation. In 1979. about $3.9 billion in federal expenditures will be devoted to them, representing a mashing 82 percent of all
such expenditures.
The costs of regulation are felt by our citizens in many ways. It
adversely affects the prospects for economic growth and productivity by
levying a claim for a rising share of new capital formation .
ECONOMIC COSTS
It is usual to believe, at first, that federal regulation is resisted and
resented primarily because it levies an economic toll on the commerce of
the day. But there are grave rcasom for doubting that this is the only
reason.
The absolute cost of regulations in dollars is O\erwhelming for large
businesses, prohibitive for small. Do" Chemical Company, tor example,
, pent $186 million to meet requirements of federal regulatory agencies in
1976 (4). Thi~ co\t represents 3.3()70 of ~ales and 30070 of profih for Do\v
in 1976. In 1975, General Motors spent $943 million simply to comply
with government regulations. That breaks do..., n to about $2000 for each
of the company employees and about S300 for each and every car G!\.1
sold in America. Large corporations may appear to be able to absorb the
high com of regulation, but it is likely 10 put smaller companies out of
busine,s.
Also to be considered are expenses incurred to comply with data requirements. The Office of Management and Budget, in its first report to
The Congress on Pre~ident Carter's effort to cut paperwork, calculated
that Americans no" ~pend 785 million hours a year filling out about 4000
federal forms, at a co~t of $100 billion (6). Thi s is not all of course. we
have to con~ider the bulk of the overall regulatory budget which is
financed by taxpayers ' monies .
Another tragic cost of regulation is the loss of many productive jobs.
The steel industry, among others, is painfully aware of this result. Foundaries have closed down because they could not meet costs imposed by
The Environmental Protection Agency, OSHA, and other government
agency regulations.
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In the construction labor area, government regulation also acts t0
reduce jobs. Under the Davis-Bacon Act, The Secretary of Lab
specifies '_'prevail_ing w,~ges to be paid on federal and federally support~~
construction proJects. In theory, that may seem desirable, at least to
some people. But in practice, these federally mandated wage rates are
often above those that actually prevail in the labor market where the
work is done.
A hidden cost of federal regulation is a reduced rate of introduction of
new and better products. The longer that it takes for some change to be
approved by a federal agency, the less likely the change will be made. The
Food and Drug Act is delaying introduction of effective drugs by about
four years (9). As a result, the U.S. is no longer the leader in medical
science. For example, we were the 30th country to approve the antiasthma drug, metaporoterenol.
The proliferation of government controls inevitably has led to conflict
among controls and controllers. In some cases, the rules of a given agency work at cross purposes with each other. More serious and more frequent are the contradictions between the rulings of two or more government agencies where the regulated have little recourse. Cases have arisen
in which the EPA has demanded that a plant converts from coal to oil to
reduce atmospheric pollution. At the same time, power plants have been
ordered to convert from oil to coal by The Department of Energy to
reduce oil consumption. Anti-pollution requirements have forced some
companies to abandon marginal plants, a policy which conflicts with
federal goals of reduced unemployment.
Each regulatory agency seems to be exclusively preoccupied with its
own narrow interest, regardless of the effects of its actions on the company, a whole industry, or even to society as a whole.
The suggestion that business internalize more of the "social costs" of
their operations implies to some that costs are absorbed, not paid. Bui
these costs are obviously passed on in the price of the product. Nevertheless, they are real national costs; the resources used for this purpose
cannot be utilized for other purposes. We cannot long endure such costs
when they contribute to our acute capital shortage, a shortfall estimated
over the next ten years at approximately $ I trillion.
According to Paul MacAvoy (3), the reallocation of investment from
productivity increasing projects to project~ meeting government regula1ion has probably reduced overall GNP growth by one-quarter to onehalf of a percentage point per year.
.
The additional cost of regulation has weakened the competitive position of heavy industries in foreign markets and added to the deficit in our
balance of trade.
A primary and unanswered question concerns the justification for
these regulatory costs. There are, of course, great benefits from environmental improvements. However, improving the environment in the
broader sense of the term is costly, drawing on resources that could have
been used elsewhere. The costs must be paid. But the gains, in the form
of environmental improvements, are not generally captured in our national income and other accounting data. Better access to cleaner air, for
example, does not show up as an increase in GNP. What we do when we
make environmental improvements is to accept lower economic growth,
30

as convent ionally measured, in return for an increment in unmeasured
output , or welfare. How does thi~ process of accepti~g lower measured
growth for increases in welfare intrude on the setting of wages and
prices?
Environmental improvement s lead to higher costs of production in the
steel industry, the paper industry, and the aluminum industry. They may
also increase transportation co sts in these industries by shifting plants to
less efficient locations. As a consequence, prices of these products rise.
We pay a higher price for steel because, in addition to the steel, we are
getting some increment in the environmental condition. Higher prices for
these products, and for goods that are made from them , will slow down
the growth in real wage5 as they are conventionally measured because we
are giving up some real income.
Formal escalators in many wage contracts provide that wages will be
raised automatically to compensate for price increases. Other contracts
and government programs also escalate various costs, benefits, or
remuneration by changes in the measured price indexes. As a result of
these escalations, environmental improvements impose an additional
source of inflationary pressure, not simpl y in the first round of the price
increase, but in subsequent rounds, when the rise in the price index
automatically leads to increase in wages and other prices. This increases
the rigidities in our wage-price mechani sm, and makes it more difficult to
bring inflation under control.

P YCHI C COSTS
While regulation came 10 businessmen with a relatively low price tag, it
nevertheless "as burdensome and exacted a toll of anxiety, frustration,
and dejection beyond all relation to the economic cost (2). Regulations,
the events which prompted it, and the rationale which supported it impinged on busines~men ' s moti ves and thwarted their needs.
Steiner (5) warn s that regulations which are trivial, seemingly contrary
to common sense, arbitrarily imposed and admini5tered , and difficult to
understand tc:nd to erode respect for law and willingness to comply Y.ith
it.

BENEFIT Of REG LATIO'\
We must realistically acknoy,.ledge the important and positive benefits
that have resulted from many of the government's regulatory activities
- in terms of less pollution, fewer product hazards, ending job
discrimination, and achieving other socially desirable objectives of our
society.
A certain level of federal regulation is obviously necessary to help meet
legit imate economic and social objectives. In the last decade, people's attention turned from production to improving the quality of life. This
meant high and rising minimu m income, gr eater equality o f opportunity,
better quality products at lower prices, a pollution free atmosphere,
more information fo r customers, accountability for business, and so o n.
The thrust for such improvements resulted in government regulations to
help achieve them beca use business simply cou ld not meet the new expectations, many of which were far beyond reality.
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---More_concern for individuals has re_sulled in legislation in their behalf.
Regulations have protected and subs1d1zed business interests as well as
con~umer and ~eneral public interests. Regulation has helped society
achieve economic a nd social goals. It has helped to improve the position
of minorities, achieve cleaner air, hold business accountable, prevent
abuses of the market mechanism, prevent monopoly and reduce industrial accidents. The list of pluses of government regulation is long.
THE TRADE-OHS
Both the Economic and the Psychic costs do buy real "social goods"
and benefits. Some of these benefits would not be realized without
government intervention. But at what price may we buy these goods? Is
the resulting inOation of prices, constriction of productive capacity and
increase in unemployment worth it? No one can dispute the need for consumer protection, preservalion of the environment, and employee health
and safety. But we need to re-examine our priorities, and examine most
carefully the trade-offs between social objectives and related costs.
In the long run, the public pays the costs of regulation, lost productivity, lost facilities, and the consumer cost~ of products and services made
more expensive by regulatory compliance. These numerous costs" no
doubt outweigh the benefih. Jn the aggregate, the costs of today's
government regulations seems greater than the benefits. These facts have
reached the public and their representatives, and regulatory reform ha\
become a major issue. A~ Secretary Krep\ put it, for each federal regulation it is es~ential to ask: What does it cost? What benefits are we buying? Do these costs and benefits accurately reflect our priorities? h there
a way to achieve the same benefits at lower cost? (I)
WHAT GOVERNMENT IS DO l ",G
In October, 1978, The Senate passed the "Program Evaluation Act."
The Act sets out a ten year schedule to review and reauthorize all the
federal programs, according to budget funclion. No program that has
nol been specifically reauthorized by Congress shall continue to funcuon
after the review date established in the schedule. This measure is called
the "sunset" approach to regulatory reform. The house did not act. Ex·
pectations are that the legislation will be back in the current Congress_.
The Executive Branch is also pursuing regulatory reform. The Prest•
dent signed an executive order that requires executive departments to:_
- Publish a semiannual agenda of upcoming regulatory actions in
order that all interested parties may provide their views on regulations.
Develop a plan for all significant regulation~ which assures that the
views of the public are considered in the agencies' decisions; that
the regulation does not conflict with those of other agencies; ~h_at
the regulat ion is written clearly; and that there is a speci fie official
accountable for the regulatiom.
Increase oversight by policy officials of the regulation development
process to assure that regulat ions a re in the best interest o f the
public.
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_ Prepare a regulatory analysis for all major regulations to assure
that feasible alternatives have been analyzed and that the mo\t
effective and the lea<,t burdensome approach has been chosen.
_ Undertake a systematic review of existing regulations.
The President, also, established a regulatory council consisting of all
Executive Branch regulatory departments and agencies. One of the principal functions of the council is to prepare a unified calendar of major
regulations. The calendar would provide for the first time a comprehensive list of regulations that the federal government is proposing, together
with information on their cost. their objectives, and why they must be
issued (their benefits).
In the Commerce Department, Secretary Krep'> is promoting the concept of a "regulatory budget" which will analyze the long term costs a nd
benefits of regulations. assess regulatory priorities, and provide a comprehensive framework for evaluation of the government-wide regulatory
process.

CAI\ THE GOVER'\M E'\T SUCCEED?
The successful application of cost-benefit analysis to regulation decisions is to a large extent an art. The approach is, traditionally, concerned
with the question of economic efficiency of resource utilization. In
"social" regulation, it is usually impossible to measure the bendits solely in monetary terms. For v.e arc dealing here with human beings - with
levels of health, with intangible needs and satisfactions. To find methods
of measurement to the benefits of regulatory programs, we mu~t call
upon sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, e,cn ecologists.
Creating meaningful standards may be difficult; in \Orne instances, impossible. Recognition of the difficulties, however, ought not to deter us
to develop the appropriate methodology. Too much is at stah.
Under the pressures of a greatly acceh:rated pace of \OCial evolution,
our nation is undertaking unprecedented program\ without adequate
knowledge of the overall costs. If efforts arc put together, solutions
might begin to evolve by perceptive dissection of proposals, for the purpose of quantitative treatment. This would assist government in their
priority judgements. The need for such judgements is one of the most important unsolved problems of our day. The Pre<,idcnt and Congress
realize that they need more help in this area.
Not all questions can be ansv.ered and some amwers mus1 be ba,ed on
poli1ical considerations. Bu1 many quantitative fragments are determinable and would inform and sharpen the action, of legislators. Furnishing Congress a nd the President with the costs and benefits of each
suggested program would help them to do their job more effectively.

S MMAR\ AND CONCtU ION
Cos! of regulation has t wo significant ends. First, go,ernment today is
an acuve managerial partner with business executives. This partnership
exte?~s all the way from the governance of the corpora tion to the
spe:tftc ways in which products a re produced and distributed. Many
business managers loday are in fact act ing as agents of the government
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without being under contract (8). Second, government is losing th
power of motivated individuals in the decentralized market process. e
An excess of benefits over cost indicates economic efficiency no matter
who the beneficiaries are and who are the losers. The need is great to
reduce the massive array of government laws, rules, and regulations
which give an inflationary bias to the economy and often also reduce job
opportunities in the process. It is difficult to criticize the basic mission of
regulation and, in fairness, we must acknowledge that the programs
established to deal with some of our problems have yielded benefits to
our nation. H owever, our total efforts have not been outstandingly successful; often there has been no noticeable improvement and, sometimes,
we seem to have made the situation deteriorate more rapidly than it
would have without intervention.
Cost-Benefit analysis is not a guarantee of less government intervention in the economy, but it will help to insure less costly and less disruptive regulation where government action is necessary.
I believe the time has come to realize that, when business grows more
slowly than government, when economic expansion is more precluded
than encouraged, when potential profits are spent supporting government rather than realistic goals, the public interest is not being served.
Comprehensive regulatory reform is still very much in the future. Even if
it comes to pass, our most pressing problem with government will be only
partly addressed. The public needs a more basic, more intrinsic change in

government attitude.
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